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Key findings
 Ukrainian society is in favour of a pro-European course for its country. Just 
like three years ago, currently (in 2015) half of Ukrainians (51%) support 
their country’s accession to the European Union. At the same time, the 
percentage of people who are favourably disposed towards the model 
of integration proposed by Russia – the Eurasian Union – has decreased 
by half. This integration direction is currently supported by 17% of 
respondents.
 Ukrainians support their country joining NATO. Among persons who would 
take part in a referendum concerning NATO, two-thirds would be in favour 
of membership of this organisation.
 Ukrainians recognise the advantages of closer ties between their country 
and the EU: they consider that it is in the interests of Ukraine (57%), and 
that it will strengthen its international position (59%) and economy (56%). 
At the same time, they consider that closer ties are also beneficial for 
the EU (53%). In the last two years, belief in the positive consequences of 
Ukraine drawing closer to the EU has weakened, in most cases by about 10-
20 percentage points. However, this decrease is accompanied not so much 
by an increase in negative answers (these have changed by percentages 
that lie within the margins of statistical error), as by an increase in the 
group of people who are not able to give an answer to this question.
 An even greater drop concerns assessments of possible tightening of ties 
between Ukraine and Russia. Here the percentage of positive answers 
has dropped by 17-39 points since 2013. However, in this case, there was 
an increase not only in groups of people who could not answer, but also 
those who negatively rate closer ties with Russia. What is more, in all cases 
negative opinions outweigh positive ones.
 Ukrainians are divided in their opinion as to whether their country has 
drawn closer to or moved further away from the EU in the last year. 
The largest group of respondents states that in the last year, Ukraine 
has neither drawn closer to nor moved further away from the EU (44%). 
Comparable groups of respondents give more decisive answers: 21% 
consider that their country has drawn closer to the EU, while 23% state 
that it has drifted away.
 Half of Ukrainians hold Russia responsible for the current conflict (49%). 
One-third claim that both countries bear responsibility in equal measure 
(33%), and 9% point to Ukrainian responsibility.
 On average, half of Ukrainians favourably rate the policies of Western 
countries towards the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Positive opinions clearly 
outweigh the negative ones, but there is also a relatively large percentage 
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of persons who are undecided (about one-fifth of respondents). Polish 
policy (57%) is most favourably perceived, followed by that of Germany 
(52%), the EU (51%), and the United States (46%).
 The support that most Ukrainians expect from the EU and its member 
states is humanitarian aid for refugees (75%) and economic aid (73%). Over 
half of respondents also expect the lifting of visas (56%) as well as the 
sending of military equipment to the training of the Ukrainian army (55%). 
One-third respondents would like Western countries to send their troops 
to Ukraine.
 Ukrainians strongly support sanctions imposed on Russia by Western 
countries. In total, two-thirds of respondents want a tightening (50%) 
or maintenance (15%) of the current sanctions. A clear minority are in 
favour of easing (6%) or lifting sanctions (8%), but as many as one-fifth of 
respondents do not have an opinion on this matter (21%).
 A positive attitude to the West is most common among Ukrainians living in 
western regions, and those who are better educated and younger. 
Introduction
Ukrainian society is facing a deep political, economic and social crisis, 
which has been aggravated by the policies of the Russian government, 
escalating from economic pressure to military intervention. This Russian 
reprisal for Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity seems to have strengthened 
the determination of Ukrainians in their pro-European choice, which was 
confirmed through democratic presidential and parliamentary elections. The 
annexation of Crimea and the military activities of Russian-backed separatists 
in eastern Ukraine have met with condemnation on the part of Western 
democracies. The EU and the United States imposed economic sanctions on 
Russia. At the same time, international institutions and individual countries 
have supported Ukrainian reforms so that Ukraine could emerge from the 
crisis and strengthen ties with the EU and Western democracies while 
defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The aim of the present 
study was to determine how Ukrainian society evaluates the policies of the 
most important Western partners supporting Ukraine’s path to democracy 
and economic development, and to find out what the expectations are as to 
further actions by the international community. A further aim of the study was 
to check whether popular support for integration with European structures 
remains firm.
The Institute of Public Affairs conducted studies in Ukraine in 2000, 2010, 
and 2013. On this basis, it is possible to observe the dynamics of change 
and indicate how the current conflict has influenced the views of Ukrainian 
residents. At the beginning of 2015, the Institute of Public Affairs together 
with the German Bertelsmann Stiftung also examined the opinions of Poles, 
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Germans, and Russians concerning the conflict. The results were presented 
in the report “Close Together or Far Apart? Poles, Germans and Russians on 
the Russia-Ukraine Crisis”, which revealed many similarities between Poles 
and Germans in their perceptions of the current situation and the need to 
undertake action by their respective governments. The study also revealed, 
among other findings, the lack of consent on the part of the Russian public to 
send Russian troops to eastern Ukraine.
The present opinion poll – commissioned by the Institute of Public Affairs 
and Bertelsmann Stiftung in Ukraine – was carried out by the Ilko Kucheriv 
Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Olexander Razumkov Ukrainian 
Centre for Economic and Political Studies from 22 to 27 July 2015, on a 
representative sample of 2011 adult Ukrainians via the face to face method.1
In the study, similarities and differences in answers of respondents were 
analysed depending on age, education, and region of residence. In the case of 
classification according to place of residence, the country was divided into 
five regions: West (Zakarpattia, Lviv, Volyn, Rivne, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, 
Chernivtsi), Centre (Khmelnytskyi, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Kyiv, Cherkasy, 
Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv oblasts), South (Mykolaiv, 
Kherson and Odessa oblasts), East (Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia and Kharkiv 
oblasts), and Donbas (unoccupied territories in the Luhansk and Donetsk 
oblasts).
A Pro-European Course for Ukraine
Ukrainian society has never been uniform in its opinions about the 
direction in which the country should go – towards integration with the EU 
or with Russia. Studies conducted at the Institute of Public Affairs since 2000 
have confirmed this divide. In both 2000 and 2010, surveys indicated that a part 
of society was in favour of acceding both organisations – the EU the Union 
of Belarus and Russia. However, about half of all respondents have always 
favoured acceding to the EU. In late 2013, just before Euromaidan started, 50% 
of respondents favoured Ukraine joining the EU, whereas 33% favoured the 
Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, and 12% did not want their 
country to join either of these two communities.
1 The study did not encompass the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the occupied territo-
ries in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Before the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict (January 2014), the-
se regions (parts of which are currently encompassed by the conflict) were inhabited by the following numbers 
of people: Autonomous Republic of Crimea – 1,967,000 people, the city of Sevastopol – 386,000 people, Donetsk 
Oblast – 4,344,000 people, Luhansk Oblast – 2,240,000 people. The population of Ukraine was then 42,837,000 inha-
bitants (source: https://ukrstat.org/operativ/operativ2015/ds/kn/kn_r/kn0515_r.html [accessed: 8 August 2015]). 
The conflict sparked a huge wave of migration – according to United Nations estimates, close to 1.3 million inha-
bitants have already moved from the occupied regions – from Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts and from Crimea – to 
other parts of Ukraine. Many people from these regions have also emigrated to other countries – including to the 
EU and Russia.
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Half of Ukrainians are in 
favour of their country’s 
accession to the European 
Union. Those in favour of 
joining the Eurasian Union 
are in the minority. Their 
percentage has halved in 
relation to 2013.
Figure 1. 
Which union should 
Ukraine join? Replies by 
Ukrainians in 2015 (%)
Source: The Institute 
of Public Affairs and 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
2015.
Similarly, in 2015, half of Ukrainians (51%) are in favour of accession to 
the EU. However, the proportion of people who are more favourably inclined 
towards the model of integration proposed by Russia (the Eurasian Union) 
has decreased by half. This direction of integration is currently supported 
by only 17% of respondents. At the same time, currently, the percentage of 
respondents who do not have a defined opinion in this matter is relatively 
large (32%). 
The above data show firstly that Russian policy towards Ukraine 
engenders reluctance towards integration projects proposed by Moscow 
amongst a large section of Ukrainians. At the same time, the large percentage 
of undecided respondents highlights the uncertainty of parts of Ukrainian 
society as to which solution would be best for their country. The Russian 
direction of integration is losing support, as Ukrainians have 
been effectively discouraged from it by Russian policy. At 
the same time, support for integration with the EU has not 
grown, which may be linked with disillusionment among part 
of Ukrainian society with the results of hitherto relations with 
the EU (e.g., lack of membership perspective, insufficient help 
from the EU, or scepticism towards the pro-EU elite currently 
governing Ukraine). Those who earlier supported cooperation 
with Russia do not believe that integration with the EU would 
be a better choice for Ukraine. 
Among various groups of respondents, differences, often very significant, 
can be observed regarding their choice of preferred direction of integration. 
A division into regions is, above all, visible. The most pro-European is the west 
of Ukraine – where as many as 82% of respondents support integration with 
the EU and only 5% are inclined towards the Eurasian Union. In the remaining 
parts of the country, accession to the EU is less popular – in the centre of the 
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Figure 2. 
How would you vote in a 
referendum concerning 
Ukraine’s membership 
of NATO? Replies of 
Ukrainians who would 
participate in 
a referendum (%)
Source: The Institute 
of Public Affairs and 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
2015.
country, support for it is 53%; in the south – 39%; and in the east– 38%; whilst 
in the unoccupied territories of Donbas – 32%. In these regions, there is, at the 
same time, great indecision – one-third of respondents cannot indicate which 
direction of integration they prefer. Integration with the Eurasian Union is 
more popular than the European direction only in Donbas and only by three 
percentage points (see Anex, p. 27). 
Breakdown by age group shows that support for integration with the EU 
is particularly high among respondents from the 18-24 (60%) and 25-29 (59%) 
age groups. Support for Ukraine’s accession to the EU falls the higher the age 
of respondents, and in the group of people aged 60 and over is 42%. At the 
same time, support for the second direction of integration – with the Eurasian 
Union – increases the higher the age is. Among people aged 18-24, it is only 9%, 
whilst among the oldest age group – 22%. 
In the choice of the direction of integration, a strict correlation with level 
of education can be observed – support strengthens for integration with the 
EU and weakens for integration with the Eurasian Union with an increase in 
level of education.
 Support for their country’s pro-Western course can also be perceived in 
the support of Ukrainians for their county’s integration into NATO. Nearly two-
thirds of respondents declare readiness to take part in a potential referendum 
on this subject (62%). Amongst them, a decisive majority of people supports 
Ukraine’s accession to NATO (64%). On the other hand, 37% from amongst 
those willing to take part in a referendum is against NATO accession.
Ukrainian society is very consistent on both issues – drawing closer to 
the EU and NATO: two-thirds amongst respondents who indicate the EU as a 
direction of integration are also in favour of Ukrainian membership of NATO.
The scale of support for NATO membership of the country depends on 
the place of residence, age, and education. Support for NATO accession 
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Figure 3. 
What is your opinion 
on deepening relations 
between Ukraine and the 
European Union? Replies 
by Ukrainians in 2015 (%)
Source: The Institute 
of Public Affairs and 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
2015.
predominates in the west and centre of Ukraine. Amongst 
residents of the south, east, and Donbas, the conviction that 
Ukraine should not become a member of the alliance tends to 
dominate (see Anex, p. 27). Support for integration with NATO is 
strongest among respondents aged 18-24, and weakest among 
people aged 60 and over. As in the case of support for the EU, 
the percentage of supporters increases with level of education 
regarding being in favour of membership of NATO.
Ukrainians perceive that closer ties between Ukraine and 
the EU may bring many benefits to Ukraine. Most respondents 
consider that it is in the interests of Ukraine (57%), will strengthen its 
international position (59%) and is important for its economic development 
(56%). Persons who do not agree with these statements are in the minority 
(21%, 14%, and 19% respectively). 
At the same time, a clear minority of respondents agree with statements 
concerning possible negative outcomes of integration, such as that drawing 
closer to the EU will deprive Ukraine of sovereignty in international relations 
(27%), will destroy its economy (22%), or threaten the development of its own 
culture (24%), whereas many more respondents reject them (39%, 49%, and 51% 
respectively). Over half of the respondents also consider that drawing closer 
is in the interest of the EU (53%). A large group also agrees with the opinion 
that the EU understands Ukraine (40%), although in this case, the percentage 
of people who think the opposite is not much lower (32%).
Ukrainians are in favour of 
their country joining NATO. 
In a potential referendum on 
the subject, among persons 
who would take part in it, 
two-thirds of respondents 
would be in favour of this 
solution.
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Ukrainians perceive 
the advantages of their 
country drawing closer to 
the European Union; they 
consider that it lies in the 
interests of Ukraine, and will 
strengthen its international 
position and economy. At the 
same time, they consider that 
it is also beneficial for the 
European Union.
The biggest advantages concerning closer ties with the EU are perceived 
by inhabitants of western Ukraine2 and better educated people.3 The positive 
perception of closer ties with the EU decreases among the 50-59 age group. 
There is a particularly noticeable drop among the oldest studied group (60 and 
over).4 
Support for Ukraine’s integration with the EU is closely linked with the 
conviction that strengthening ties with the EU is in the interest of Ukraine. 
Practically all (95%) of the respondents who support Ukraine’s 
membership of the EU indicate the benefits of closer integration. 
Two-thirds of those in favour of a pro-Western course for 
Ukraine believe that the EU understands Ukraine’s needs; 89% 
consider that stronger ties with the EU are important for the 
economic development of Ukraine; and 88% are convinced of 
the strengthening of Ukraine’s position on the international 
arena in connection with this integration. The supporters of the 
pro-Western option, are not, however, free of doubts. Some of 
them tend to agree that Ukraine may lose its independence in 
international relations (19%) and also that Ukrainian culture is 
threatened (15%) by deeper integration with the EU.
Respondents who prefer Ukraine’s integration with the Eurasian Union, 
however, often perceive a threat in integration with the EU. Over half of the 
respondents from this group see a threat to the Ukrainian economy (59%) 
and culture (52%) in integration with the EU. The positive effects of Ukraine 
drawing closer to the EU, on the other hand, are perceived by only a small 
percentage of respondents in this group – 13% perceive a positive influence 
on Ukrainian economy, and 16 % on the international position of their country 
At the same time, respondents consider that strengthening the ties 
between Ukraine and the EU is also in the EU’s interest. Seventy per cent of 
supporters of the pro-Western direction share this conviction. These people 
also believe that the EU understands the needs of Ukraine. This group can be 
called Euro-enthusiasts. Their assessments are thus motivated differently than 
those of people who are in favour of closer ties with Russia, amongst whom 
half (49%) believe that a pro-Western course by Ukraine is in the interests of 
the EU. Forty per cent of respondents consider that Ukraine’s integration 
2 Eighty-two per cent of respondents from this region consider that closer ties are in the interests of Ukraine; 
55% consider that the EU understands the needs of Ukraine; 81% consider that drawing closer is important for the 
economic development of Ukraine; 80% believe that the EU can help in strengthening the international position 
of Ukraine. In the remaining regions, drawing closer to the EU is assessed less positively, whilst at the same time 
the percentage of people who are unable to assess the influence of drawing closer to the EU on the situation of 
Ukraine is growing (from 20% to 40%).
3 The higher the level of education, the more frequently respondents agree that closer relations with the EU 
are in the interest of Ukraine, the EU understands the needs of Ukraine, and closer ties strengthen the position of 
Ukraine and are important for the economic development of the country.
4 Half of respondents from the 60 and over age group consider that closer ties with the EU correspond to the 
interests of Ukraine (compared to 57% of the general population), are significant for strengthening its interna-
tional position (51% compared to 59% of the general population) and economic development of Ukraine (49% 
compared to 56% of the general population). One-third are of the opinion that the EU understands the needs of 
Ukraine, whilst among all respondents this percentage is 40%.
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Figure 4. What is your 
opinion on deepening the 
relations between Ukraine 
and the European Union? 
Replies by Ukrainians in 
2010, 2013, and 2015 (%)
Source: The Institute of 
Public Affairs, 2010 and 
2013, and the Institute 
of Public Affairs and 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
2015.
with the EU will be in the interests of both parties. One in ten consider that 
such integration is in the interests of Ukraine, but does not have an opinion 
regarding possible benefits for the EU. Similar group of respondents believe 
that integration with the EU is only in the interests of the EU, but will not 
benefit Ukraine (10%).
Comparing the latest IPA study with the results from the 2013 poll shows 
that belief in positive consequences of stronger ties between Ukraine and 
the EU has weakened – in most cases by a dozen or so percentage points (by 
13% to 21%, to be precise). However, this decrease is not correlated with an 
increase in the number of negative answers but with an increase in the group 
of people who feel unable to give an answer to this question. Whereas in 
2013, the percentage of undecided respondents ranged between 6% and 13%, 
currently it oscillates within the range of 22% to 34%. Such a change shows 
a growing sense of uncertainty towards the EU. The protracted economic 
crisis within the eurozone may be having an influence on this – showing that 
membership of the EU is not a ticket to a continuous increase in prosperity. 
Secondly, some Ukrainians who rate the actions of the EU towards the current 
crisis in Ukraine negatively may manifest their discontent through a cooler 
attitude to the EU. These people may have doubts as to whether the EU will be 
able to help Ukraine in the future, as currently its activity disappoints them.
However, there was a very large increase in positive statements on the 
subject of drawing closer to the EU between 2010 and 2013 – sometimes by 
tens of percentage points, with a lot of people considering that the EU was the 
right choice for Ukraine. 
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Figure 5. 
What is your position on 
a possible deepening of 
relations between Ukraine 
and Russia? Replies by 
Ukrainians in 2015 (%)
Source: The Institute 
of Public Affairs and 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
2015.
The views of Ukrainians on the subject of their country drawing closer to 
Russia are clearly less favourable than in the case of drawing closer to the EU. 
Negative opinions about Russia often outweigh positive ones, or there are 
sometimes a similar numbers of positive and negative answers. 
On the whole, Ukrainians tend to disagree that Russia understands 
Ukraine’s needs and that closer relations with Russia are in Ukraine’s interest. 
Almost half the respondents see Russia as a threat to Ukraine’s sovereignty in 
international relations, while the opinions are almost equally split regarding 
the importance of Russia for Ukrainian economy and culture. However, a clear 
majority thinks that Russia has an interest in deepening its relations with 
Ukraine.
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Figure 6. 
What is your position on 
a possible deepening of 
relations between Ukraine 
and Russia? Positive 
replies by Ukrainians in 
2010, 2013, and 2015 (%)
Source: The Institute of 
Public Affairs 2010 and 
2013 and the Institute 
of Public Affairs and 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
2015.
A comparison of respondents’ answers concerning the relations with 
Russia in 2013 and 2015 shows that the percentage of positive answers has 
fallen in this case by 17-39 percentage points. In this case, however, not only 
has the group of undecided respondents grown (currently 21-32 percentage 
points), but also the number of those who negatively assess the prospect 
of closer relations with Russia increased by 4-18 percentage points. The 
percentage of respondents who agree that closer relations with Russia are in 
the interests of Ukraine, are important for Ukraine’s economic development 
or will strengthen Ukraine’s international position has decreased by half. This 
clearly shows an increase in distrust of Russia and a belief that a possible 
integration with Russia is not a desirable scenario.
A breakdown by region shows significant differences in attitudes towards 
the prospect of closer relations between Ukraine and Russia. Western 
Ukraine is the area of the country that is most critical of relations with Russia, 
followed by the centre, and then south and east of Ukraine. However, it should 
be emphasised that the unoccupied territories of the Donbas region deviate 
somewhat from this pattern – respondents from this area perceive various 
aspects of closer ties with Russia more negatively than inhabitants of eastern 
regions. 
The opinions of younger respondents stand out in particular in questions 
concerning various aspects of relations with Russia.5 Criticism of relations 
5 Barely 18% of people from the 18-24 age group consider that establishment of closer ties with Russia is con-
sistent with the interests of Ukraine (compared to 30% of respondents in general) and that Russia understands 
the needs of Ukraine (compared to 28 % of respondents in general). Forty-four per cent of respondents from this 
age group state that stronger ties with Russia will damage the Ukrainian economy (36% among respondents 
in general), and somewhat less than one quarter (24%) consider that drawing closer is important for economic 
development of Ukraine (compared to 36% of respondents in general). Half of the respondents in the 18-24 age 
group consider that closer relations with Russia threatens the development of Ukrainian culture, whilst among 
respondents in general this percentage is 40%.
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A drop in trust towards 
Russia and an increased 
reluctance for closer ties 
between Ukraine and 
Russia is noticeable among 
Ukrainians.
with Russia also intensifies with an increase in education levels. 
The better their education is, the more likely respondents are 
to agree that stronger ties with Russia are a threat to Ukraine’s 
sovereignty, to disagree that closer relations with Russia will 
strengthen the international position of Ukraine, and that 
integration with Russia is consistent with the interests of 
Ukraine.
Just as respondents who are in favour of pro-Western integration positively 
assess its effects, so, too, supporters of a pro-Russian direction mostly have a 
good opinion about the effects of drawing closer to Russia. Among supporters 
of an eastern direction of integration, 85% agree that closer ties with Russia are 
consistent with the interests of Ukraine, 78% believe that Russia understands 
the needs of their country, 89% perceive benefits for the development of the 
Ukrainian economy, and 68% believe in strengthening Ukraine’s international 
position in result of closer relations with Russia. However, among supporters 
of a pro-Russian direction there are also small groups of respondents who call 
into question the positive effects of integration with Russia, even though they 
are generally in favour of this direction for Ukraine. Sixteen per cent of the 
supporters of membership of the Eurasian Union consider that strengthening 
ties with Russia undermines the position of Ukraine in the international arena, 
8% expect negative influence on Ukrainian culture, and 6% consider that it 
would damage the economy of Ukraine.
Supporters of the pro-Western course agree that closer relations with 
Russia would negatively affect the position of Ukraine on the international 
scene (63%) and the Ukrainian economy (54%), and that it constitutes a threat 
to Ukrainian culture (58%). At the same time, among supporters of the pro-
European option, 21% believe that closer ties with Russia are important 
for the Ukrainian economy, 14% believe that they will strengthen Ukraine’s 
international position, and 17% believe that Russia understands the needs of 
Ukraine.
Both among supporters of integration with the EU and supporters of 
integration with the Eurasian Union, over half consider that strengthening 
of ties between Ukraine and Russia is consistent with the interests of Russia 
itself. Sixty-one per cent of respondents declaring support for a pro-European 
course for Ukraine are convinced of such a convergence of interests, as are 
86% of supporters of an alliance with the Eurasian Union. Also, in response 
to the question whether stronger relations with Ukraine are in the interest of 
the EU, supporters of both the pro-European and pro-Russian direction tend to 
agree more than in the other questions about the consequences of deepening 
relations with the EU and the Eurasian Union. This shows that in Ukrainian 
society, there seems to exist an opinion about Ukraine as a geopolitical trophy 
in the struggle between East and West.
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Figure 7. 
What is your position on 
a possible deepening 
of relations between 
Ukraine and the European 
Union/Russia? Replies by 
Ukrainians in 2015 (%)
Source: The Institute 
of Public Affairs and 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
2015.
The clear pro-Western attitude of Ukraine is shown, however, by the 
presentation of positive answers to all questions concerning the EU and Russia. 
Differences in favour of the EU in some cases are over 20 percentage points. 
Ukrainians associate integration with the EU in comparison with Russia much 
more frequently with an opportunity to strengthen the international position 
of Ukraine and its economy.
IPA studies conducted in previous years showed that there was a 
significant group (42%) in Ukraine which advocated simultaneously drawing 
closer to both the EU and Russia. Current results indicate that this group is 
smaller than ever. Only every tenth respondent acknowledges that both 
directions of integration are consistent with Ukraine’s interests (positively 
answering both the question as to whether closer ties with the EU are in 
Ukraine’s interests and the same question about stronger ties with Russia). 
Similarly, 10% of respondents consider that both the EU and Russia are aware 
of Ukraine’s interests, and also that closer ties with both Russia and the EU 
will strengthen Ukraine in the international arena. At the same time, every 
tenth Ukrainian considers that closer ties with each of these two partners 
threatens the independence of Ukraine in international relations. Eight per 
cent of respondents believe that neither of these two options is a threat.
Ukrainians are, however, divided as to whether their country is moving 
towards the West (towards the EU). The largest group of respondents claim 
Ukraine has neither drawn closer to nor moved away from the EU over the 
last year (44%). Similar numbers of respondents chose opposite answers: 21% 
believe that the country has drawn closer to the EU and 23% that it has moved 
further away.
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Ukrainians are divided in 
their opinions as to whether 
their country has moved 
closer to or further away 
from the European Union.
Figure 8. 
Has Ukraine moved closer 
to or further away from the 
European Union over the 
last 12 months? Replies by 
Ukrainians in 2015 (%)
Source: The Institute 
of Public Affairs and 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
2015.
When the answers are broken down by region, it turns out that only 
respondents from Western Ukraine most frequently opted for the answer 
“Ukraine and the EU have moved closer to each other over the past 12 months”. 
A total of 37% of respondents in western Ukraine gave this answer. In the other 
regions, the most popular answer was that little had changed in relations 
between the EU and Ukraine. In southern and eastern regions, as well as in 
the Donbas region, more respondents believe that the EU and Ukraine have 
moved further away from each other rather than closer together.
Respondents’ opinions on Ukraine’s closeness to the EU 
over the last 12 months reveal a strong correlation with age. 
People aged 60 and older less frequently believe that Ukraine 
and the EU have moved closer together (17%), while this view is 
most frequently held by those aged 18-24 (25%).
Ukrainians are divided on whether their country has moved 
closer to the EU depending on whether they are in favour of 
European integration or prefer to move closer to Russia. The most common 
view among supporters of integration with the Eurasian Union is that Ukraine 
has moved neither closer to nor further away from the EU over the past 12 
months (51%). However, at present, in this group there is also the widespread 
belief that the distance between Ukraine and the EU is increasing (33%). 
Among the proponents of a European path to integration for Ukraine, the 
percentage of those who believe that Ukraine has moved closer to the EU 
(36%) is almost identical with the percentage of those who believe that this 
issue has remained unchanged over the last year (37%). Almost one-fifth (18%) 
consider that Ukraine has moved further away from the EU. 
A sharp fall of support for closer integration of Ukraine with Russia can 
be explained by the belief that the latter is responsible for the continuing 
conflict. This is the view taken by half of the respondents (49%). However, one-
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Half of Ukrainians consider 
that Russia is responsible 
for the current conflict. 
One-third consider that 
both countries bear equal 
responsibility.
Figure 9. 
Who do you think is 
responsible for the 
Ukrainian-Russian conﬂ ict? 
Replies by Ukrainians in 
2015 (%)
Source: The Institute 
of Public Affairs and 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
2015.
third of respondents believe that both countries – Russia and Ukraine – are 
responsible for the conflict, while 9% only blame Ukraine. 
More Ukrainians point to the guilt of both countries than did respondents 
from Poland who answered the same question in February 2015. At that time, 
barely one-fifth (20%) of Poles claimed that the blame lies with both Ukraine 
and Russia, while 61% stated that Russia is primarily responsible for the 
conflict.
Once again, respondents’ answers depend on their age. This is because 
the percentage of respondents who blame Ukraine for the conflict increases 
with age. In the 18-24 age group, only 5% of respondents believe that Ukraine 
is responsible, as compared with 12% of those who are 60 years old or above.
Differences in answers were also determined by regional factors. In the 
west of Ukraine, 5% placed most of the blame for the war on Ukraine, while 
67% think that Russia is the guilty party. Respondents from the Donbas region 
are at the opposite end of the spectrum – 18% mostly blame Ukraine for 
hostilities, whereas 24% regard Russia as responsible. The most common view 
held by respondents in southern and eastern Ukraine as well as 
in the Donbas region is that both countries carry equal blame 
for the conflict.
When education is taken into account, there is a clear 
correlation indicating that the higher the level of education, 
the more likely respondents are to believe that Russia bears 
responsibility for the conflict and the less inclined they are to 
regard both sides as equally guilty.
Positive Assessment of Western Policy
It can be presumed that the support for Ukraine’s pro-Western orientation 
will largely depend on the assessment of the policies of the EU and its member 
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Figure 10. 
How do you assess the 
policies of the European 
Union, United States, 
Poland, and Germany 
towards the Ukrainian-
Russian conﬂ ict? Replies 
by Ukrainians in 2015 (%)
Source: The Institute 
of Public Affairs and 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
2015.
Half of Ukrainians rate the 
policy of the West towards 
the Ukraine-Russia conflict 
highly. Polish policy garners 
the most praise.
states towards Ukraine and in relation to the Ukraine-Russia conflict. These 
include political initiatives and political attitudes, and the economic or 
military support offered. Such activities can encourage or discourage the 
strengthening of ties with the West and strengthen or weaken the trust that 
Ukrainians have in the Western world, including the EU.
Half of Ukrainians rate the policy of Western countries 
towards the conflict highly. Positive opinions prevail over 
negative ones. Poland’s activities (57%) are perceived best, 
then those of Germany (52%), the EU (51%), and the United 
States (46%). The policy of the United States garners the worst 
opinions (35%), while negative assessments of the EU, Germany, 
and Poland are held by: 29%, 26%, and 22% of respondents respectively. As 
in earlier questions, a relatively high proportion of respondents – one-fifth – 
does not have an opinion on this matter. 
Positive and negative assessments of the policies pursued by the above-
mentioned countries and the EU partly coincide with one another. One in every 
five respondents hold negative views of all these countries, while 60% of the 
respondents do not give a negative score to any Western country or the EU.
The number of respondents with a positive view of the policies adopted by 
Western countries in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict declines the further east 
one goes. Those respondents who have a positive opinion of the policies of the 
EU, Poland, and Germany are more inclined than the respondents as a whole 
to support a European path to integration (the level of support for EU entry 
among those with a positive opinion of the policies of the EU, Poland and 
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Figure 11. 
What kind of support do 
you expect for Ukraine from 
the European Union and its 
member states, including 
Poland and Germany? 
Replies by Ukrainians in 
2015 (%)
Source: The Institute 
of Public Affairs and 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
2015.
Ukrainians above all expect 
humanitarian aid for 
refugees and economic aid 
from the European Union. 
They less frequently point 
to lifting visas and sending 
military equipment and 
training the Ukrainian army. 
One-third would like troops 
from EU countries to be sent 
to Ukraine.
Germany varies between 73% and 79%, while the average is 51%). This indicates 
that the positive assessment of the actions of the EU itself as well as those of 
its member states correlates with the pro-European stance of Ukrainians. At 
the same time, however, one-fifth of those who have a negative opinion of 
the policies of the EU, Poland, and Germany also favour a Western direction 
of integration, which may be an indication of the impatience on part of the 
Ukrainian public with the thus far results of the policies of the key Western 
partners. At the same time, those respondents who have a positive view of the 
actions of the United States are more in favour of Ukrainian membership of 
NATO than the other respondents.
Expectation Towards Western Partners – Humanitarian Aid for Refugees 
and Economic Support
Facing armed conflict in the east of the country and deep 
economic crisis, Ukraine expects concrete support – which 
meets its real needs – from the international community, 
especially from its closest neighbours. The most expected 
support – indicated by three-quarters of respondents – is 
humanitarian aid for refugees (75%) and economic aid (73%). 
Over half of respondents also expect the lifting of visas (56%) 
as well as sending military equipment to eastern Ukraine and 
training the Ukrainian army (55%), while every third respondent 
would like EU states to send their troops to Ukraine.
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The high percentage of people who expect help for refugees should not 
come as a surprise. According to data presented by the United Nations from 
May 2015, the annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbas have led to a 
situation where about 1,300,000 people have already decided – or been forced 
– to migrate to other regions of Ukraine that are not affected by the war.6 
Answers indicating the need for economic help in the current disastrous 
state of the Ukrainian economy are also understandable. In the course of 
last year (2014), Ukraine’s GDP fell by 6.8%, and in the first three months of 
2015 by 18% in comparison with the first three months of 2014. Inflation in 
April reached 61% in relation to the previous year, which resulted in a clear 
impoverishment of society.7 In February 2015, the minimum wage fell to 1,218 
hryvna (approximately 50 euros), in other words, less than it is in Bangladesh, 
Ghana, and Zimbabwe.8
What is surprising, however, is that only around half of Ukrainians consider 
that the lifting of visas would be a preferable form of support for their country 
(although twice the number of people support this solution than oppose it). 
This may be due to several factors. Respondents may not perceive the link 
between the lifting of visas and support for Ukraine – on the contrary, some 
may even judge that if some inhabitants go abroad, this may be detrimental 
for their country. In Ukraine, anxious voices can be heard saying that too many 
people have already emigrated and that there won’t be anyone left to rebuild 
the country. Respondents may at the same time relate the question to their 
own personal situation (as this issue directly concerns citizens). In this case, 
no opinion – or not recognising the need for such help – may be linked to the 
fact that many Ukrainians still do not go abroad (and do not even move within 
their own country), and, furthermore, do not even possess a passport. Surveys 
conducted by the Institute of Public Affairs in 2013 show that barely 31% of 
Ukrainians possessed a passport entitling them to travel abroad. At the same 
time, 40% emphasised that they had never been abroad. Part of the public 
may also feel too poor to travel. Thus, for a large part of Ukrainian society, the 
lifting of visas is a purely hypothetical act. 
The relatively low support for the demand to send armies from other 
countries to help Ukraine suggests that some Ukrainians may fear that their 
territory will be transformed into an area of wider confrontation between the 
West and Russia. It seems that they prefer to make use of equipment and face 
the attackers themselves, without relying on the armed forces of EU countries.
Expectations of help vary depending on a respondent’s region of origin. 
Expectations of economic aid are much stronger among respondents in the 
west (83%) and the centre of the country (78%) than in the south (61%), east 
(67%), and the Donbas region (65%). There is also more expectation in west and 
6 http://zn.ua/UKRAINE/v-ukraine-chislo-vnutrennih-bezhencev-dostiglo-1-3-mln-chelovek-oon-176231_.html
7 http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komentarze-osw/2015-06-16/okret-na-mieliznie-poglebiajace-sie-
-problemy-ukrainskiej
8 http://www.ekonomia.rp.pl/artykul/1197569.html 
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Figure 12. 
What kind of support 
should your country give 
Ukraine? Replies by Poles 
and Germans in February 
2015 (%)
Source: The Institute 
of Public Affairs and 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
2015.
The higher the respondents’ 
level of education the more 
likely they are to expect help 
from countries in the West.
central Ukraine (75% and 64%, respectively, with an average of 55%) of military 
aid (weapons and training) from Western countries. Moreover, the percentage 
of people in western and central Ukraine who expect direct military 
intervention from the West is higher than the percentage of respondents who 
do not desire such help (56% as against 33% in the west, and 41% as against 
35% in the centre). On the other hand, the number of respondents in all regions 
(including the Donbas) who would like to see visas waived is greater than the 
number of people who do not expect support in this area. The one exception in 
this case are the eastern regions in Ukraine (Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and 
Kharkiv oblasts).
Moreover, the help expected by respondents depends 
on their age. Overall, EU involvement is desired more by 
respondents aged 18-24 and 24-29 than by respondents in other 
age groups. On the other hand, people aged 60 and above are 
more opposed to EU involvement than respondents as a whole. 
The one exception concerns the issue of humanitarian aid for Ukraine – in this 
case, differences in the respondents’ age are not visible. Moreover, the higher 
the respondents’ level of education, the more likely they are to expect help 
from countries in the West.
Significant differences can be perceived while comparing the expectations 
of Ukrainian society with the opinions of Poles and Germans on assistance 
to Ukraine. Although the percentage of Poles and Germans in favour of their 
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Half of Ukrainians are 
in favour of tightening 
sanctions against Russia.
respective country imparting economic aid to Ukraine is relatively high, 
amounting to over half of the respondents, it is decidedly lower than the 
percentage of Ukrainians who expect such aid. Whereas, half of Ukrainians 
would like Ukraine to receive support for their army from EU countries, only 
one-tenth of Germans and one-quarter of Poles in February 2015 were in 
favour of sending military equipment to Ukraine or training the Ukrainian 
army. Scepticism in Poland and Germany is also prevalent regarding the lifting 
of visas. The expectations of over half of Ukrainians in this matter is supported 
by only 30% of surveyed Poles and 17% of surveyed Germans.
From a comparison of the above data, it transpires that significant 
differences exist between the level of expectations of residents of Ukraine 
regarding foreign help for their country and the readiness to impart such aid 
on the part of societies of two key EU countries, i.e., Germany and Poland.
Support for the Tightening of Sanctions
As a result of the annexation of Crimea and military involvement in 
eastern Ukraine, the EU imposed political and economic sanctions on Russia, 
the main purpose of which was to support Ukraine and force Russia to stop 
its aggressive policy towards this country. Although sanctions are having a 
negative effect on the Russian economy, they have not significantly changed 
the Kremlin’s policy towards Ukraine. 
Sanctions enjoy strong support in Ukraine. Two-thirds of respondents 
are in favour of maintaining or tightening them, with 15% of respondents 
in favour of maintaining them in their current form, although 50% consider 
that the current sanctions are insufficient and need to be tightened. These 
people probably not only think that tightening sanctions is a legitimate 
step (as Russian troops are intensively involved in the conflict), but also 
that additional sanctions will encourage the Russian government to stop its 
aggressive actions. 
A clear minority of surveyed Ukrainians want sanctions 
to be relaxed (6%) or lifted (8%), and the remainder are 
undecided (21%), which in this case is relatively high. Such a 
large percentage of undecided respondents may indicate that 
many people do not understand what link they have with the 
situation in Ukraine. 
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Figure 13. 
The current sanctions 
imposed on Russia by the 
EU should be: Replies by 
Ukrainians in 2015 (%)
Source: The Institute 
of Public Affairs and 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
2015.
Views regarding the future of sanctions depend on respondents’ perception 
of who is responsible for the outbreak of the conflict. The largest part of 
those respondents who believe Ukraine is responsible demand that sanctions 
against Russia be lifted (40%). On the other hand, the prevailing opinion among 
those who see Russia as culpable is that sanctions need to be increased (75%). 
Furthermore, those respondents who believe both sides are equally responsible 
for the conflict are more inclined to favour increasing sanctions than other 
solutions, although not so willingly as the previous group does (32%). At the 
same time, however, the largest number of respondents who blame both sides 
for the conflict have no opinion on the future of sanctions (36%).
Those in favour of increasing sanctions are at the same time more inclined 
than others to believe that aid should be provided to refugees, Ukraine should 
receive economic assistance and military support in the form of equipment 
and training of soldiers, and visas should be waived. On the other hand, 
compared with these forms of support, they are less in favour of the idea 
of sending the army to eastern Ukraine, although they are more favourably 
disposed to this idea than the respondents in general.
Support for the sanctions imposed by Western countries varies from 
region to region in Ukraine. The desire for tougher sanctions is strongest in 
the west of Ukraine (74%), and least popular in Donbas (26%) and the east 
of the country (27%). The percentage of people in all regions of Ukraine who 
believe that sanctions should be increased is higher than the percentage of 
respondents who claim that sanctions should be lifted.
Whether or not to increase sanctions against Russia is also strongly 
related to age. Respondents aged 60 and above stand out from the others 
in this respect. They are more opposed to sanctions than the respondents 
as a whole (13%). The strongest support for tougher sanctions comes from 
respondents aged 18-24 (55%) as well as those in the 40-49 age group (56%). 
The high level of support for broadening sanctions among 40-year olds may be 
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Figure 14. 
The current sanctions 
imposed on Russia by the 
EU should be: Replies by 
Poles and Germans in 
February 2015 (%)
Source: The Institute 
of Public Affairs and 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
2015.
due, as has already been mentioned above, to the strong opposition to Russia’s 
current policy precisely among this group of respondents, as well as to the 
fact that they are bearing the main economic burden of the war. Differences 
in education levels are also important – the higher their education level, the 
more likely the respondents were to support increasing sanctions and the less 
inclined to believe that sanctions should be lifted.
When asked about the preferred future of sanctions in February 2015,9 Poles 
and Germans were in favour of tightening them or leaving them at current 
levels, with Polish responses, in particular, being close to Ukrainian ones in 
the matter of the possibility of tightening sanctions. A small minority of Poles 
were in favour of easing sanctions in February 2015, and this percentage is 
identical with the current percentage of Ukrainians sharing this opinion. One 
should note, however, that these results are not fully comparable, because 
in the research in Ukraine, respondents also had the possibility of answering 
that sanctions should be lifted.
Conclusions
The data presented here clearly show that in spite of significant costs borne 
by Ukrainian society, the European choice still enjoys support among most of 
Ukrainian society, whilst support for closer political and economic ties with 
9 And thus at a time when the decision in the EU about a successive prolongation of sanctions in their existing 
form had not yet been taken.
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Russia is falling. At the same time, traditional divisions in Ukrainian society 
are noticeable, i.e., between inhabitants of western regions and the young and 
better educated on the one hand, and more Eurosceptic groups in the east and 
older Ukrainians on the other. One major factor behind this division may be 
Ukrainians’ access to information on the EU and its involvement in the crisis. 
While overall support for European integration remains relatively steady, there 
is certain impatience with the results of EU-Ukrainian relations and perceived 
lack of progress in many fields. This clearly points to the need for improving 
the communication by the EU and its member states and to more energetically 
counter Russian propaganda aimed at the Ukrainian population. Moreover, such 
steps should not be limited to the young and educated, although strengthening 
their support for a pro-Western approach is also necessary.
Ukrainians also generally positively assess the policies of their Western 
allies. They support the economic sanctions imposed on Russia and would 
like them to be tightened. At the same time, they expect clear support from 
EU countries, with the priority for them being economic and humanitarian 
aid. For Poland and the other Western countries involved in the Ukrainian 
transformations, the challenge is to continue to meet these expectations in 
such a way that the process of democratic and market reforms in Ukraine 
becomes a success. 
Important activities have already been arranged – Western countries and 
international institutions are planning to invest billions of euros to support 
Ukraine. Support mechanisms from the EU include – 1.8 billion euros as Macro 
Financial Assistance coming from the EU budget,10 1.4 billion euros as grants, 
loans from European Investment Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (up to eight billion euros), and support through the 
Neighbourhood Investment Facility. What is more, the EU is ready to help 
modernise Ukraine’s gas transit system and provide technical assistance 
during the process of reforms.11 The International Monetary Fund will provide 
a 15-billion-euro loan, while the United States has declared readiness to 
give Ukraine two billion dollars in 2015 as well as plan further support.12 In 
January 2015, Polish officials declared the provision of Ukraine 100 million 
euros in financial support.13 In April this year, the German national bank KfW 
announced that it will support the reconstruction of eastern Ukraine with 
the amount of 500 million euros.14 What is crucial now is the appropriate 
exploitation of financial resources by Ukraine and the further readiness of the 
West to develop support for this country and adjust it to the contemporary 
need of reforming the Ukrainian state.
10 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-3020_en.htm
11 http://europa.eu/newsroom/files/pdf/ukraine_en.pdf
12 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/41903692-5bc3-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html#axzz3nt7C3RWP
13 http://tvn24bis.pl/ze-swiata,75/rzad-polski-zapoczatkowal-program-kredytowania-ukrainy-jaceniuk-to-
-ogromne-wsparcie-calej-gospodarki,507398.html
14 http://www.money.pl/gospodarka/wiadomosci/artykul/pomoc-dla-ukrainy-niemcy-udziela-500-
-mln,40,0,1815592.html 
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Anex 
Map 1: 
Which union should 
Ukraine join? Replies 
by Ukrainians in 2015 
(regions, %)
Map 2: 
How would you vote in a 
referendum concerning 
Ukraine’s membership 
of NATO? Replies of 
Ukrainians who would 
participate in a referendum 
(regions, %)
the European Union
the Eurasian Union
with Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan
82%
5%
82%
5%
53%
10%
38%
26%
39%
26%
32%
35%
regions not included in the opinion pool
in favour
against
71%
11%
71%
11%
51%
27%
23%
59%
27%
45%
16%
54%
regions not included in the opinion pool
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